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More Equitable Britain–Africa Relations 
Post-Brexit: Doomed to Fail?
Dirk Kohnert
Abstract: High-flying illusions on the part of the proponents and grim 
predictions on the part of the sceptics have characterised the controversy 
around Brexit. The article assesses five key issues at stake for post-Brexit 
relationships between Britain, the EU, and Africa: market access, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), aid, security, and the nature of the partnership. 
The analysis focuses on those sub-Saharan African countries that belong 
to the Commonwealth, as the British government’s vision of a “Global 
Britain” relies heavily on its reinforced cooperation with Commonwealth 
nations. The review of potential developments in these different policy 
fields shows that the expectations of Brexiteers and African politicians 
alike concerning an enhanced, partnership-like post-Brexit Common-
wealth relationship are largely unfounded. Although the post-Brexit 
United Kingdom will increase African countries’ choices regarding pre-
ferred trading partners, it remains questionable whether London could 
offer something new that other global players with increasing interest in 
Africa, such as China, do not already have on their agenda.  
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Introduction 
The controversial discussion about the potential impact of the Brexit – 
that is, the impending withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
European Union (EU) by the end of March 2019 – on Africa has been 
characterised by high-flying illusions on the part of the proponents and 
grim predictions on the part of the sceptics. Two years ago, shortly after 
the Brexit vote of June 2016, Ansorg and Haastrup (2016) published an 
excellent overview of the major issues at stake for Africa, which was then 
complemented by an in-depth study on the impact of Brexit on African 
Commonwealth states in October of the same year (Langan 2016). Since 
then, additional studies have completed and updated this picture, includ-
ing a comprehensive recent report from the European Centre for Devel-
opment Policy Management (Bilal and Woolfrey 2018). The following 
analysis summarises and reassesses these studies in light of new devel-
opments. In view of the still highly controversial Brexit policy and the 
fact that neither a hard “no-deal” Brexit nor a second referendum can be 
ruled out (Bellamy 2018; Kettle 2018), some of the conclusions present-
ed necessarily remain tentative.   
Brexit: Principal Issues at Stake for Africa 
Remarkably different perspectives on the potential impact of Brexit on 
Africa have shaped the current scholarly debate (Bilal and Woolfrey 
2018). Brexit could bring about increased ambiguity and resilience, but it 
could also generate new opportunities and investment for Africa. But 
what exactly are the issues at stake for Africa? In the following, I focus 
on five issues that could arguably have the greatest impact on sustainable 
cooperation between both the UK and Africa and the EU and Africa: 
market access, foreign direct investment (FDI), aid, security, and part-
nership. This review of potential developments and challenges focuses 
on the 19 Commonwealth states of sub-Saharan Africa – which include 
heavyweights such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Egypt, and Ghana – 
because the British government’s vision of a “Global Britain” relies 
heavily on reinforced cooperation with Commonwealth nations. 
Better Access to Markets for Africa?   
For most African Commonwealth countries, Britain has been by far the 
biggest market for their exports. According to the British Parliament, the 
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liberalised post-Brexit trade policy should enhance the sales prospects of 
African economies (RAS-APPG 2017).  
It is possible that the majority of the Anglophone state governments 
will try to renegotiate or even pull out of disputed trade agreements with 
the EU following Brexit. Tanzania, for example, has already discarded a 
proposed economic partnership agreement (EPA) between Brussels and 
the East African Community (EAC) countries, citing the “turmoil” en-
gulfing the EU following the Brexit vote and the skewed terms of the 
agreement (Gutteridge 2016). The government in Dar es Salaam indicat-
ed in February 2017 that it would not sign the EAC-EPA until it has 
conducted an in-depth analysis of the prevailing circumstances, particu-
larly with regard to issues such as Brexit (Gutteridge 2016).  
The government in London currently claims that it will protect nas-
cent African industries with its post-Brexit trade policy, which is sup-
posed to stand in stark contrast to the EU’s EPAs (RAS-APPG 2017). 
However, in the case of a hard or “no-deal” Brexit, African countries will 
no longer have preferential access to the UK if London does not succeed 
in negotiating new bilateral agreements with African governments in 
advance. In view of the limited time left before March 2019, this appears 
unlikely. The exclusion from preferential access to the UK holds not just 
for signatories of the EPAs, but also for participants in the EU free trade 
agreement and the EU general system of preferences, including the duty-
free, quota-free market access under the Everything But Arms initiative. 
Major adverse consequences are predicted for countries such as South 
Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, and Mauritius, as the UK accounts for 
approximately 25 to 30 per cent of their exports to the EU. These im-
pacts will be intensified in the event of a – likely – recession in the UK as 
a consequence of Brexit (Bilal 2016; Ansorg and Haastrup 2016). More-
over, within the remaining EU, the African Commonwealth countries 
will lose the UK as an intermediary and advocate. This could result in a 
stronger Francophone and Lusophone bias in the EU’s Africa trade 
relations at the expense of the African Commonwealth (Bishop and 
Clegg 2018: 5). The EU, on the other hand, is unlikely to renegotiate 
EPAs in the near future in order to adapt them to Brexit. Last but not 
least, it is doubtful that the UK on its own could compete more success-
fully with other trade interests, such as China and India, than within the 
EU partnership in the global run for Africa’s resources. 
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More Foreign Direct Investment at the Expense of the 
African Poor? 
On the occasion of the G20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017, British 
prime minister Theresa May announced sweeping post-Brexit program-
mes to reduce African countries’ reliance on aid (Little 2018). London 
envisaged increasing Africa’s long-term prosperity via combined trade-
enhancing programmes such as “aid for trade” (OECD 2017), financial 
instruments (see section 4), and the promotion of FDI in Africa (UK 
Government 2017). 
The amount of UK investment in Africa, which more than doubled 
between 2005 and 2014 from GBP 20.8 billion to GBP 42.5 billion, was 
meant to be enhanced by Brexit. South Africa will most likely remain the 
largest recipient of UK FDI (Vines 2018: 122–123). It already accounted 
for 29.8 per cent of total UK (outward) FDI in Africa in 2014 (Hardie 
2016). Industry, mining, and financial services have been the main indus-
trial sectors receiving British FDI, with the first two accounting for 54.4 
per cent and 34.3 per cent of total UK FDI into Africa in 2014, respec-
tively (Hardie 2016). However, a British accounting firm expects post-
Brexit FDI to decline rather than increase (Vines 2018: 123). 
As a complement to increased FDI, Prime Minister Theresa May al-
so announced at the G20 summit in Hamburg that the British govern-
ment will seek to boost the integration of African countries into global 
financial markets post-Brexit. Among other things, she promised to 
contribute GBP 60 million for the construction of a strong and transpar-
ent African financial market (UK Government 2017). According to The-
resa May’s rather elusive announcement, the UK will seek to stimulate 
financial innovations, to enhance the autonomy of the African banking 
sector, and to allocate financial resources where they are most needed.  
In addition to restoring the role of private financing within the 
framework of British economic development strategy as a “hallmark of 
building Global Britain” (DFID 2017), London will aim to use the 
unique role of the British state for the expansion of financial markets 
(Price 2018b). Thus, Theresa May offered her African peers a strong 
partnership with the City of London in order to make the City the finan-
cial hub for Africa, among other regions, by channelling private capital to 
former colonies there and elsewhere.  
Increased Aid for Africa? 
The British government’s perspectives on future aid relationships be-
tween the UK and Africa after Brexit are closely entangled with Britain’s 
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trade and financial policy. This applies particularly to London’s focus on 
“aid for trade,” “trade, not aid,” and private sector development as out-
lined above. Although Prime Minister Theresa May has on several occa-
sions in 2017 and 2018 reaffirmed the British government’s commitment 
to spend 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) on aid (enshrined 
in law in 2015, see Heppell, Crines, and Jeffery 2017), it is likely that 
Brexit could result in a decrease in UK aid for Africa, for the following 
reasons. 
First, reinforced by revelations of scandals within Oxfam and other 
development NGOs, British anti-aid sentiment has grown in recent 
years, with the alleged ineffectiveness and mismanagement of aid raised 
as critiques. Moreover, the divorce from the EU will deprive the UK of 
substantial multiplier effects in relation to aid (Price 2018a). In fact, the 
government in London already stated in 2013 that the collective EU aid 
provisions enable the “reach and magnitude of EU financial instru-
ments” – which include the European Development Fund (EDF), the 
EU’s main instrument for providing development aid to the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) – to “outweigh those the 
UK could bring to bear bilaterally” (UK Government 2013, quoted in 
Price 2018a: 3). This has allowed the UK to focus “scarce national re-
sources on priorities elsewhere” in times of austerity (UK Government 
2013, quoted in Price 2018a: 3). Thus, the British government apparently 
saw the EU as a catalyst for enhancing its own aid. Deprived of this, 
Britain’s willingness to fulfil its aid pledges could decrease significantly.   
Another reason for diminishing aid could be a possible devaluation 
of the pound sterling, with a corresponding negative impact on the value 
of British aid in Africa and elsewhere. This could be aggravated by a 
likely fall in British GNI as a direct or indirect result of Brexit. In view of 
the UK’s relatively poor growth forecasts, this raises questions about 
London’s ability to meet its aid commitments (Bishop and Clegg 
2018: 5). In addition, the British government could be tempted to reallo-
cate scarce resources to domestic spending in response to pressure from 
populist politicians (Ansorg and Haastrup 2016; Price 2018a). Finally, 
London could focus on bilateral partnerships at the expense of its con-
tributions to the multilateral development cooperation efforts of the UN, 
including the United Nations Development Programme; the United 
Nations Children’s Fund; the United Nations Volunteers; the World 
Health Organization; the United Nations Environment Programme; the 
World Bank, including the International Development Association; the 
International Monetary Fund; and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tu-
berculosis, and Malaria. Such a downward spiral could be aggravated by a 
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reduction in overall EU development assistance, given the prominent 
role of the UK as one of the major contributors to the EU’s aid budget 
and the advocator of the 0.7 per cent aid target within the EU (Ansorg 
and Haastrup 2016).   
Enhanced Security for Africa? 
The EU is still the main contributor to the African Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA) and the African Peace Facility (APF) (Ansorg and 
Haastrup 2016). The APF is the main channel for EU support for the 
African Union’s and African Regional Economic Communities’ efforts 
in the area of peace and security, with an overall amount of more than 
EUR 2.7 billion provided since 2004 (EC 2018). The Peace Fund is in-
tended to provide the necessary financial resources for the operationali-
sation of APSA, and comprised a total of USD 25 million in 2017. By 
means of this facility, Britain, which contributed just 3 per cent bilaterally 
to APSA in 2014, was also able to contribute continentally rather than 
just bilaterally to African peace and security initiatives, using the multi-
plier effect of the EU’s 75 per cent APSA funding in its own interest 
(Nathan et al. 2015). Thus, British bilateral funding was far less than the 
German bilateral funding, which was four times as great (12 per cent of 
total bilateral funding of APSA).   
The British government has repeatedly claimed that its defence ex-
penditures are the largest in the EU, that it has the largest defence indus-
try, and that it has contributed to most of the operations and missions of 
the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Duke 2018: 44). 
However, London has apparently exaggerated its input deliberately in 
order to enhance its bargaining position for a new post-Brexit security 
partnership with the EU, which would include the issues of defence, 
cybersecurity, and external migration (Duke 2018: 44–45). Britain pro-
vided just 2.3 per cent of the cost of all CSDP missions, or 4.3 per cent 
of those operations to which it contributed, according to data from the 
European University Institute (Duke 2018: 44–45). This is considerably 
less, for example, than France, Spain, or Italy’s contributions to civilian 
and military operations. Moreover, the UK did not contribute to most 
missions in Africa, apart from the mission at the Horn of Africa intend-
ed to secure the seaways from Europe to Asia. Instead, France assumed 
the lead in nearly all of these missions.  
 
 
 More Equitable Britain–Africa Relations Post-Brexit 125 
A Partnership of Equals or Collective Clientelism?  
Some Brexiteers and African politicians have expressed their hope for a 
golden era with a rediscovered but deeper and more partnership-like 
post-Brexit Commonwealth relationship. African governments envisage 
using their negotiating advantage as in-demand partners to press for 
more protection of their domestic markets and infant industries 
(Westcott 2018). This strategy might work in areas where British prod-
ucts and services do not compete with African markets. However, it is 
questionable whether the UK will allow for less rigid tariff-rate quotas 
and non-tariff barriers to trade, more flexible rules of origin, or greater 
protection against British service exports if the British industry could be 
affected negatively. Moreover, a more liberal attitude on Britain’s part 
concerning imports from Africa – for example, with regard to quotas 
and other non-tariff barriers – could increase the cost of future trade 
agreements between the UK and the EU, especially if London has to 
leave the EU customs union. Although Britain is proud of its strong 
bilateral relations with the Commonwealth network, these relations, 
especially with the most important African players, South Africa, Nigeria, 
Ghana, and Kenya, have been not without tensions – for example, con-
cerning brain drain from the former British colonies to the UK.1 Last but 
not least, it is unlikely that new and better deals between both Britain and 
Africa and the EU and Africa as a consequence of Brexit will materialise 
soon; the UK and the EU will first focus on their most important global 
partners and competitors when reassessing their international relation-
ships and partnerships (Westcott 2018).  
Under these conditions, a partnership of equals between the UK 
and Africa and a win-win situation for both sides is unlikely. Moreover, 
Brexit will not only challenge European integration but will also put 
African regional integration efforts at risk (Ansorg and Haastrup 2016; 
Henökl 2017: 70). African regional trade is characterised by overlaps 
between regional organisations with competing agendas. The EU’s past 
experiences with negotiating the EPAs have proven that it is an extreme-
ly difficult task to consolidate incomplete African regional projects. It is 
doubtful whether London will be more successful in this respect. How-
ever, if London replicates the existing patchwork of EPAs and other EU 
trade arrangements across Africa instead of pushing for a continent-wide 
solution, this will likely add to existing barriers to intra-continental free 
1 In 2015, for example, the UK was the biggest recipient of South African skills, 
taking in over 18,500 skilled South Africans, according to a 2015 report by In-
terNations Expat Insider (BusinessTech 2016).  
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trade (Murray-Evans 2017). The same applies to relations with the newly 
created African Continental Free Trade Area initiative (Ezeani 2018). 
The best available strategy for most African least developed countries, 
especially the smaller ones, will probably be one of patronage or “collec-
tive clientelism” (Ravenhill 1985: 3, 43; Price 2018a, who applies this 
concept) – that is, making concessions on non-trade-related issues, such 
as voting behaviour in the UN or other non-comparable assets, in ex-
change for better market access and protection. Thus, the governments, 
especially of small African states, may fall back on the traditional seesaw 
policies they used with success to outwit global players during the Cold 
War.  
Outlook: What Next? 
On 28 August 2018, Prime Minister Theresa May started her first three-
day visit to Africa in order to build up new trade relations with key na-
tions ahead of Brexit. On her tour of South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya, 
she emphasised the enormous opportunities presented by Britain’s post-
Brexit policy. She presented ambitious plans that would allegedly deliver 
a major Brexit boost for British firms and investors and promised to turn 
Britain into a truly global nation doing business around the world in 
economies with massive and growing potential. On the second day of 
the tour, during her visits to Nigeria, she unveiled a proposal to create 
the first UK–Africa FinTech Partnership in Lagos.  
At first glance, these developments appear to support optimism 
about post-Brexit relations between the UK and African Commonwealth 
nations. In view of China’s long-standing and successful Africa offensive, 
however, it remains questionable whether London can offer something 
that other countries with increasing interest in Africa do not already have 
on their agenda. African leaders are in the comfortable position of being 
able to choose: enhanced cooperation with China, the huge EU bloc, the 
potential riches of the US, or the historically linked UK. Possibly, the 
Africans will play one partner off against the other, choosing the best for 
their clientele. In doing so, they will be well aware of the relative im-
portance of each trading partner, a consideration which would not ne-
cessarily favour the UK given the strong bargaining position of the major 
competitors. In 2015, total trade (imports and exports combined) be-
tween Africa and the UK amounted to USD 36 billion (GBP 28 billion), 
but EU–Africa trade amounted to USD 305 billion and China–Africa 
trade to USD 188 billion (Madowo 2018). Despite its historical ties with 
many countries on the continent, the UK may therefore not be African 
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nations’ first choice given its competitive disadvantage in terms of trade 
volume.  
Time is running out for the United Kingdom. London has just 
started to introduce legislation meant to ensure that African businesses 
will be able to access the UK market on the same terms as they currently 
do under the diverse trading regimes (Madowo 2018).  
Finally, the issue of migration, which is inseparably intertwined with 
the Brexit vote, will not disappear with Britain’s exit from the EU. Re-
building economic incentives around mutual interests and reciprocity, 
within the framework of a humane form of globalisation, will be one of 
the big themes of future post-Brexit relations between Britain, the EU, 
and Africa (Collier 2018; Baldwin, Collier, and Venables 2017).  
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Gleichwertigere England-Afrika Beziehungen Post-Brexit:  
Zum Scheitern verurteilt? 
 
Zusammenfassung: Hochfliegende Illusionen der Befürworter und 
grimmige Vorhersagen der Skeptiker haben die Kontroverse um den 
Brexit geprägt. Der Artikel untersucht fünf Themenfelder, die für Bezie-
hungen nach dem Brexit zwischen Großbritannien, der EU und Afrika 
eine zentrale Rolle spielen werden: Marktzugang, ausländische Direktin-
vestitionen, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Sicherheit und die Art der 
Partnerschaft. Die Analyse konzentriert sich auf jene Länder südlich der 
Sahara, die zum Commonwealth gehören, da die Vision der britischen 
Regierung eines „Global Britain“ auf eine stärkere Kooperation mit 
diesen Commonwealth-Staaten abzielt. Die Analyse möglicher Entwick-
lungen in den verschiedenen Politikbereichen zeigt, dass die Erwartun-
gen von Brexiteers und afrikanischen Politikern hinsichtlich einer stärker 
partnerschaftlichen Beziehung nach dem Brexit weitgehend unbegründet 
sind. So bleibt fraglich, ob London den afrikanischen Partnern etwas 
anbieten kann, dass andere Länder mit wachsendem Interesse an Afrika 
wie China nicht bereits auf ihrer Agenda haben. 
 
Schlagwörter: Großbritannien, Brexit, EU, Afrika, internationaler Han-
del, Zölle, Entwicklungshilfe, Sicherheit, Partnerschaft 
